



My App Strategy

Source, profile, permissions per app · belongs with Chapters 7, 8 and 11 · Device: _____ · Date: _____

The source of an app is as important as its permissions. An app is not just code. It is also the source, which determines who built it, and the signature, which determines who is allowed to deliver updates. Under GrapheneOS, the app signature is the developer's identity, and every update must carry exactly the same signature. For permissions there is one rule: an app only gets what it strictly needs for its core function. Everything else is optional convenience, and that is exactly where most privacy problems originate. Convenience is not a security concept.

1 · THE DECISION PATH FOR EVERY NEW APP (CHAPTER 8)

No	Source	Code	What is behind it	Decision
1	GrapheneOS App Store	AS	Pre-installed, deliberately small selection, own builds. No account, no trackers, no hidden dependencies.	Use it. This is the secure default.
2	Accrescent	ACC	Installed from the App Store. Developers sign their apps themselves, Accrescent pins the signature from the first installation and rebuilds nothing. Only a small number of apps, that is the concept.	Use it.
3	Obtainium (direct developer source)	OBT	Fetches the app directly from the developer, no store intermediary. Original signature, updates often within minutes of release. Risks: wrong source, wrong CPU architecture, incorrect release mapping. The first installation is the moment to verify the signature (AppVerifier, Chapter 11).	Only with understanding of the source. You take responsibility yourself.
4	F-Droid	FD	Open source, but an intermediary: F-Droid compiles many apps itself and signs them with its own keys. Updates often arrive with a delay.	Weigh up. Fine for simple tools, not the first choice for security-critical apps.
5	Aurora Store	.	Downloads from the Play Store via shared anonymous accounts, which violates Google's terms and can stop working at any time. An intermediary without its own verification, GrapheneOS advises against it.	Look for alternatives.
R	Zap Store (radar)	ZAP	Developers publish directly, identified by cryptographic keys rather than central accounts. Still young, no replacement for the levels above, but a good radar for new, freedom-oriented apps (Chapter 13).	Watch and try out.

2 · MY SHEET: ONE ROW PER APP

App	Source	Profile	Net-work	Loca-tion	Camera	Mic	Con-tacts	Stor-age	Note (what for, what denied, what is missing)
			☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
			☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
			☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
			☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
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			☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
			☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	
			☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	

Source: AS = GrapheneOS App Store · ACC = Accrescent · OBT = Obtainium, directly from the developer · FD = F-Droid · ZAP = Zap Store · PLAY = Sandboxed Google Play (only if the app does not run without it)

Profile: M = main profile · P = Private space · U: ____ = separate user profile, with a short code (Chapter 15)

Boxes: empty = denied · X = allowed · W = only while in use · for location add ~ = approximate only. Camera and microphone never permanently, storage only the assigned folder (Storage Scopes), contacts only an empty or minimal address book (Contact Scopes).

⚠ **Network is a separate permission under GrapheneOS.** Allow it only if the core function is online. A flashlight or calculator that demands internet access is a red flag (Chapter 7). ⚠ **A signature change at an update is a warning sign.** Either the developer lost their key, or someone else is suddenly delivering code. Both are a problem. Android then refuses the update. Do not uninstall and reinstall, check the source instead (Chapter 8). ⚠ **Google-dependent apps bundled in exactly one area.** Install Sandboxed Google Play once, either in the Private space or in a separate user profile, and move every app that needs it there. As few Google instances as possible (Chapter 15).

Deliberately no field for accounts, user names or passwords. This sheet may be found without giving anything away.